gulf of tonkin conspiracy

Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. On 28 July, the latest specially fitted destroyer, the Maddox (DD-731), set out from Taiwan for the South China Sea. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Just before midnight, the four boats cut their engines. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. 15. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. For the maritime part of the covert operation, Nasty-class fast patrol boats were purchased quietly from Norway to lend the illusion that the United States was not involved in the operations. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. In a conversation with McNamara on Aug. 3, after the first incident, Johnson indicated he hadalready thought about the political ramifications of a military response and hadconsulted with several allies. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. 11. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. The secondary mission of the Gulf of Tonkin patrols was to assert American freedom of navigation in international waters. Both boats opened fire, scoring hits on the tower, then moved on to other buildings nearby. Congress supported the resolution with Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression . For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. He spoke out against banning girls education. Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. 10. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. 8. A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. The intelligence community, including its SIGINT component, responded with a regional buildup to support the increase in U.S. operational forces. Illumination rounds shot skyward, catching the patrol boats in their harsh glare. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. Hickman, Kennedy. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. 302-303. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. . As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. . Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration of war. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. 9. "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. ThoughtCo, Feb. 16, 2021, thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345 (accessed March 4, 2023). Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated PTF-3, PTF-4, PTF-5, PTF-6 (PTFfast patrol boat). One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. 14. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. He is the author of. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. $22. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. Hickman, Kennedy. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. This explanation held briefly, long enough for President Johnson -- admittedly not inclined to engage in what might be called oververification -- to rush the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. He also requested air support. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. Mr. Vaccines. That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. Nigerians await election results in competitive race. Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. . Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. Here's why he couldn't walk away. The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. The stage was set. Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964, FRUS, Vietnam, 1964, p. 603. 12. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. 313-314. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. Hanoi was more than willing to tell the world about the attacks, and it took either a fool or an innocent to believe that the United States knew nothing about the raids. In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. Conducted under the nationally approved Operations Plan, OPLAN-34A, the program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence about the commando targets, the Norths coastal defenses and related surveillance systems. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. The Maddox was attacked at 1600. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. The battle was over in 22 minutes. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. . So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. . Each sides initial after-action review was positive. On 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was ". And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. The Health Conspiracy. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. Subsequent research and declassified documents have essentially shown that the second attack did not happen. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it. Fluoride. Defense Secretary McNamara called the president about the second Phu Bai critic report at approximately 0940 that morning. The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. The electronic intercept traffic cited here is too voluminous to permit a conclusion that somehow everything was the figment of the collective imaginations on both sides. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration

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